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Abstract 
 
The present paper deals with the role of political authorities and institutions in 
explaining growth failures. We aim to search answers for three related questions: is 
there a natural resources curse? Are all types of natural resources exposed to a curse? 
Can good institutions, measured by a single indicator, avoid this “curse”? Although the 
estimates presented are supportive of negative relation between growth and relative 
resources abundance, and of the idea that good institutions enhance growth, our 
investigation do not demonstrated that if the curse exists it only appears in countries 
with inferior institutions. So, the key conclusion is that there is no justification for the 
pessimistic conviction that certain countries will remain caught up in a low growth trap 
constrained with institutions that impede their growth. At the international level, the 
main policy implication is that, the support to countries with a high share of natural 
resources in its exports should be directed towards improving specific areas of control 
fault, such as public budget and improving organizational systems, rather than imposing 
on aid-recipient countries wide-ranging global governance measures, that are usually 
measured by a cross-section general used, but subjective, index. 
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Natural resources and institutions: 
The “natural resources curse” revisited 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Looking at world economic growth, we find high growth countries and low 
growth countries; countries that have grown rapidly throughout time, and countries that 
have experienced growth spurts for a decade or two; countries that took off and 
countries whose growth collapsed (Pessoa, 2004). What is the role of natural resources 
in these collapses? What is the role of institutions in recovering from such collapses? 
How can political authorities and institutions help transform this picture? The present 
paper deals with the role of political authorities and institutions in explaining growth 
failures aiming to search answers to these questions.  
Although on the whole, countries that faced growth failures tended to be poor 
and to be located in certain regions of the world (in particular sub-Saharan Africa and 
Latin America), we find countries that suffered from growth failures at almost all levels 
of development, some of them being oil producers with relatively high levels of income. 
In fact, many fuel- and mineral-rich countries had failed to turn this resources affluence 
into assets, including human capital, which would have provided a supplementary or 
alternative long-term source of growth. The growth collapses in many countries that are 
highly dependent on commodities have given rise to the belief in the “natural resources 
curse”, according to which countries that are heavily dependent on natural resources are 
likely to grow more slowly than other countries. Although many explanations have been 
given to the negative correlation between natural resources abundance and economic 
per capita growth, the belief in the “curse” is basically supported on the basis of cross-
section comparative studies of growth for the 20-year period 1970-1990, relying almost 
all of them in the data of Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997). 
Although the natural resources curse has been considered as ‘a reasonably solid 
fact’ (Sachs and Warner, 2001: 837) and ‘one important finding in development 
economics’ (Mehlum, et al., 2006), a group of scholars (Davis, 1998; Ahammad and 
Clements, 1999; Clements and Johnson, 2003) point out that the reported negative 
outcomes of natural resources abundant economies are case-specific and that even in 
Sub-Saharan Africa economic performance is mixed, with growth miracles as Botswana 
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and disasters like Zambia. So the poor growth performance of some natural resources 
based countries should not be generalized
1
. But the heaviest argument is that if natural 
resources would be excluded, growth rates of many African countries would be even 
lower. In fact the international statistics show that in Africa manufacturing almost does 
not exist and where it exists it is neither knowledge-driven nor it is globally competitive 
or it performs better than natural resources, and so the positive effects of their linkages 
are negligible. 
For the opponents of the “curse”, the problems associated with natural resources 
dependence are political rather than economic and they can be linked to the capacity of 
governments and society to respond to large extra rents from natural resources 
production. In most cases, these revenues are wasted rather than productively invested. 
Stijns (2001) observes that natural resources affect economic growth through both 
positive and negative channels and that what matters most in terms of economic 
development is the way countries deal with their natural resources. He notes that what 
natural resources do to a country’s productivity and development prospects depends on 
the learning process involved in exploiting and developing them. In this regard, Stijns 
concurs with Wright (1990)’s proposition that if natural resources are developed 
through advanced forms of knowledge development, their positive externalities may be 
just as powerful as the ones in any other sector, including manufacturing. In addition, in 
the nineteenth century, resource-rich countries such as the United States and Australia, 
as well as the Scandinavian countries, had achieved sustained growth and large 
increases in living standards as a result of their prosperous agricultural, forest and 
mineral industries (WESS, 2006).  
As the recent surge in demand for commodities, in particular caused by the 
economic expansion of India and China, but also by the increasing world demand of bio 
fuels, could have major benefits for commodity producers, making possible natural 
resource-rich countries to attain a path of sustainable growth, it is particularly important 
to find answers for three related questions: is there a natural resources curse? Are all 
types of natural resources exposed to a curse? Can the curse be avoided by good 
institutions, which can be measured by a single indicator?  
                                                 
1 Some authors argue that there is no consistent statistical evidence that show that natural resources 
dependence lead to either faster or slower economic growth and that without evidence of a general law 
upon which to build, the past successes and failures of the economies specialized in natural resources 
remain country-specific, with no possible generalization on development patterns (e.g., Davis, 1998).  
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So, given that this paper relates natural resources with institutions, after the 
introduction we’ll begin with an explanation about the problematic of natural resources 
curse. Next, we’ll make a cross-sectional test on relating growth of GDP per capita and 
natural resources abundance. In section 4 we point out some reasons to link institutions 
to the natural resources curse, we present the Economic Freedom of World (EFW) and 
we test the effects of EFW on growth controlling simultaneously the natural resources 
specialization. Section 5 concludes and highlights some policy implications. 
 
 
2. The “natural resources curse” 
 
The idea that natural resources might be more a curse than a good thing started 
to become known in the 1980's. From then on, the 'resources curse' began refer to the 
apparent irony that countries with an abundance of natural exhaustible resources have 
less economic growth than countries without such endowment
2
. The idea of a curse was 
enforced by the results of empirical tests, although as was already noted by Stijns 
(2001), it is the primary export intensity that is tested rather than natural resources per 
se. There is not yet a theory of the negative effects of the natural resources abundance, 
but there are a large number of hypotheses that can be raised to account for that negative 
relationship
3
.  
Besides the early social explanation ‘that easy riches lead to sloth’, several other 
reasons have been advanced for this phenomenon. Firstly, the deterioration in the terms 
of trade of primary commodities as against manufactures, the famous hypothesis of 
Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) of a secular decline in the terms-of-trade of primary 
commodities in comparison with manufactures. This view basically predicted that world 
demand for primary products would grow slower than demand for manufactures or that 
productivity growth would be faster in manufacturing than in natural resource 
production, and so ending up by harming the resource-based growth. However, the 
hypothesis of a deterioration of the terms of trade is nowadays discarded as a cause of 
the curse (see for example Sachs and Warner, 2001). 
                                                 
2 The term 'resource curse thesis' was first used by Auty (1991) to describe how countries rich in natural 
resources were not able to use that wealth to boost their economies and how, counter-intuitively, these 
countries had lower economic growth than countries without an abundance of natural resources. See also 
Auty (1994; 2001). 
3 Another explanation, which we don’t explore in this paper, is that the negative relationship is merely 
spurious. 
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But the idea that productivity growth has a faster pace in manufacturing than in 
natural resources has a long story in the development economics. In fact, since the 
beginning of 1950's and in 1960's, the lack of positive externalities coming from natural 
resource sectors in comparison with manufacturing has been emphasized. For example, 
Hirschman (1958), Seers (1964), and Baldwin (1966) promoted the view that helpful 
‘forward and backward linkages’ from primary exports to the rest of the economy 
would be small. The basic idea was that manufacturing, as opposed to natural-resource 
production, leads to a more complex division of labor and hence to a higher level of 
development. The Dutch Disease models of the 1970s and 1980s retook this idea. 
Basically, a natural resources boom cause a move in factors of production from the 
manufacturing sector towards the booming primary sector in response of the increased 
rents in the latter
4
. It is above all because the manufacturing sector is characterized by 
increasing returns to scale and positive externalities that “Dutch Disease” is so harmful 
for growth (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Gylfason, 2000, 2001a, 2001b; Rodriguez and 
Sachs, 1999). But other effects are also highlighted: a decrease of the manufacturing 
sector further decreases the profitability of investments, accelerating the decrease in 
investments (Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1999a; Gillis et al, 1996; Gylfason, 2000, 
2001a). Additionally, natural resources booms increase domestic income and the 
demand for goods, generating inflation and an overvaluation of the domestic currency. 
The relative price of all non-traded goods increase, the terms of trade deteriorate, and 
exports become expensive relative to world market prices and, consequently, decline.  
Therefore, when natural resources are abundant, tradable production is 
concentrated in natural resources rather than manufacturing, and capital and labor that 
otherwise might be employed in manufacturing are pulled into the non-traded goods 
sector. As a corollary, when an economy experiences a resource boom (either a terms-
of-trade improvement, or a resource discovery), the manufacturing sector tends to 
shrink and the non-traded goods sector tends to expand. 
It is the shrinkage of the manufacturing sector that is called the “disease,” 
though there is nothing dangerous about the decline in manufacturing if, competitive 
conditions prevail in the economy as is usually assumed by neoclassical theory. The 
                                                 
4 The effects of the Dutch Disease include, besides high inflation and currency appreciation, with the 
consequent rise in input costs, especially wages, the expansion of the non-traded goods and services 
sector or the shrinking of traded goods sector due to growth-promoting effects of higher incomes and 
demand or growth-inhibiting effects of rising input costs, respectively, and finally the reallocation of 
resources (financial and human), from less attractive sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing to the 
booming minerals sector, with the resulting contraction and loss of competitiveness in those sectors. 
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Dutch Disease can be a real disease, however — and a source of persistent slow growth 
— if there is something special about the sources of growth in manufacturing, such as 
the "backward and forward linkages" stressed by Hirschman and others, if such linkages 
constitute production externalities, or the learning-by-doing stressed by Matsuyama 
(1992). If manufacturing is characterized by externalities in production then the 
shrinkage of the manufacturing sector caused by resources abundance can lead to a 
socially inefficient decline in growth. The economy loses the benefits of the external 
economies or increasing returns to scale in manufacturing. 
Another group of explanations emphasizes crowding-out effects. More 
generally, natural exhaustible resource abundance is taken to pressure some variable or 
mechanism ‘X’ that obstructs or delays growth (see Sachs and Warner, 2001). Since 
abundance of natural resource provides a continuous stream of future wealth, it 
decreases the need for savings and investments. Yet, world prices for primary 
commodities tend to be more volatile than world prices for other goods. Therefore, an 
economy based on primary production will easily shift from booms to recessions and 
this creates uncertainty for investors in natural resource economies (Sachs and Warner 
1999b).  
But the variable ‘X’ may be either the manufacturing sector, or education, or 
even openness. Natural resource wealth reduces the potential share of manufacturing 
sector for which human capital is an important factor of production. Sachs and Warner 
(1995) also argued that natural resources abundance creates a false sense of confidence: 
‘easy riches lead to sloth’. An expanding primary sector does not need a high-skilled 
labor force, and there is no incentive to increase spending on education. The need for 
high-quality education declines, and so does the returns to education (Gylfason 2001a). 
This restricts the future expansion of other sectors that require educational quality 
(Gylfason, 2000, 2001a, 2001b; Sachs and Warner, 1999b) and the technological 
diffusion in the economy (Nelson and Phelps, 1966). Natural resources abundance 
reduces the openness of an economy and hurts its terms of trade. Since natural resources 
weaken the manufacturing sector, policy makers may impose import quotas and tariffs 
that, in the short run, protect domestic producers (Auty, 1994; Sachs and Warner, 1995). 
In the long run, such measures harm the openness of the economy and its integration 
into the global economy. 
An alternative approach lies in the area of political economy. Among political 
arguments, the rent-seeking rationale, whereby economic agents pursue short-term 
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objectives to extract monopoly rents, rather than attempt to invest in the long-term 
future of the industry (Krueger, 1974). Natural resource production typically generates 
high economic rents. Gelb (1988), in particular, stresses that governments typically 
earned most of the rents from natural resource exploitation. Therefore innovation tends 
to be impeded in natural resource-abundant societies. Others argue that natural resource 
abundance inevitably leads to greater corruption and inefficient bureaucracies; or that 
high rents distract governments from investing in the ability to produce growth 
supporting public goods, such as infrastructure or legal codes. Lane and Tornell (1995) 
argue that a windfall coming from a terms-of-trade improvement or a discovery of 
natural resource deposits can lead to a fight for the natural resource rents, which has as 
the result the exhaustion of the source of the rents. In general, as long as rent seeking is 
a burden, anything that supports rent seeking will lower steady state income and 
therefore growth along the path to the steady state. The case studies in Gelb (1988) and 
Auty (1990) lend support to these political channels of influence
5
.  
A further line of argument is that resources per se are not a problem. The 
problem is precisely that they tend to have more volatile world prices. The fact that 
natural resource prices are more unpredictable than other prices is well established. This 
probably translates into greater ex-ante uncertainty for primary commodity producers, 
and also extends through to other sectors in resource-abundant economies. It is also well 
known that greater uncertainty can reduce factor accumulation through greater risk or 
because it raises the option value of waiting. Although the magnitude of these volatility 
effects would be not known with accuracy, it is generally accepted that the volatility of 
commodity prices makes investment planning difficult and, therefore, discourages 
investment. 
 
 
3. Exports of natural resources and economic growth 
 
When analysing the impact of exports of natural resources on economic growth, it is 
imperative to consider a long-lasting time period. The main reason for this is that by 
looking at changes over a long time span, short-term effects such as business cycles or 
                                                 
5 A related view is based in argumentation that natural resources provide an easy way of receiving rents 
(Sachs and Warner, 1995; Gray and Kaufmann, 1998; Ascher, 1999; Leite and Weidmann, 1999, 
Rodriguez and Sachs, 1999; Gylfason, 2001a; Torvik, 2002) and highlight the fact that natural resource 
rents stimulate economic agents to corrupt the administration in order to gain access. 
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shocks that disproportionately affect particular economies will be minimized. The near 
three decade period utilized here allows an examination of the longer-run relationships 
between natural resources and GDP per capita growth rate. 
Although the generality of empirical studies about resources curse talk in 
resources abundance they only test the external specialization of countries, because they 
use as proxy for assessing the abundance/scarcity of natural resources the share of 
primary exports in GDP (Sachs and Warner, 2001; Mehlum, 2006). In this paper we 
follow a slightly different route: we use exports of natural resources in percent of total 
merchandise exports (Xprim/X) as a proxy of the resources abundance. The reason for 
our preference is based in the fact that the share of exports in GDP is, in some extent, 
endogenous to the economic growth process.  
In a first approach, we depict in Figure 1 the relationship between the 
specialization in natural resources, measured by primary exports as a percent of total 
exports in 1980, and the growth rate of GDP per capita in the 1980-2004 period, for a 
cross-section of 119 countries. 
 
Figure 1.  
Exports of natural resources and per capita growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: built with data from WDI indicators 
 
Results depicted in figure 1, and the ones of table 1 for a sample of 119 countries show 
the negative relationship between primary exports and growth. In fact, among the 22 
countries that have experienced a negative growth rate of GDP per capita in the 1980-
2004 period, only one (Haiti) show a share of natural resources exports in total 
merchandise exports of less than 50 per cent. On the other hand, among 17 countries 
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with a rate of growth higher than 3 per cent there are 9 with a share above 50 per cent. 
But the results also show that the adjustment of the trend line is far from perfect with a 
large variability in rates of growth of the countries where primary goods are the almost 
exclusive source of exports. 
If, as Mauro (1998) argues, natural resources are associated with the emergence 
of politically powerful interest groups that attempt to influence politicians prone to 
corruption in order to adopt policies that are against the general public interest, such 
rent-seeking is probably easier in certain types of commodities than in others. So, the 
next step was to disaggregate the natural resources in 4 different categories: agricultural 
raw materials, food, fuels, and ores and metals. Column (2) of table 1 shows estimates 
for the regression of shares of exports of those 4 types of goods, at 1980, on growth rate 
of GDP per capita on the period 1980-2004. It is worth noting that for every category of 
exports the coefficient is negative and statistically significant. 
 
Table 1. 
Regression of economic growth on natural resources abundance, 1980-2004. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of GDP per capita, 1980–2004 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 
2.839* 
(8.078) 
2.795* 
(7.983) 
2.904* 
(8.042) 
4.8672* 
(3.157) 
4.865* 
(2.844) 
Xprim/X 
-0.0247* 
(-5.130) 
--- 
-0.0248* 
(-4.968) 
-0.0288* 
(-4.941) 
--- 
Fuels --- 
-0.0273* 
(-4.779) 
--- --- 
-0.029* 
(-4.526 
Food --- 
-0.0180* 
(-3.096) 
--- --- 
-0.026* 
(-3.516) 
Agricultural raw 
materials 
--- 
-0.0263** 
(-2.080) 
--- --- 
-0.030** 
(-2.025) 
Ores and metals --- 
-0.0380* 
(-4.407) 
--- --- 
-0.039* 
(-3.972) 
Log GDP --- --- --- 
-0.496 
(-1.309) 
-0.496 
(-1.193) 
2R  0.177 0.198 0.183 0.188 0.181 
F Test 26.32 8.262 24.69 13.28 5.700 
N 119 119 107 107 107 
Source: Data from World Bank (2007). 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; *Significant at 1 % level; **Significant at 5 % level. 
 
But why should the share of primary exports in total merchandise exports be negatively 
related with the rate of growth? One reason is rationalized in Barro (1991) as a result of 
conditional convergence. So, it makes sense to introduce in the equation of regression 
the log of GDP per capita of the initial period. The inclusion of this variable implies the 
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decrease of the dimension of the sample from 119 to 107 countries. However, the 
inclusion doesn’t show log of GDP per capita as a statistically significant variable 
(regressions 4 and 5, table 1).  
 
 
4. The consideration of institutions 
 
Following the theoretical work of North (1981) on why institutions are important, a 
large empirical literature has documented the huge differences in institutions across 
countries, and has shown that these can explain a large part of cross-country differences 
in output per capita. Among the empirical studies that have been done in the last years 
about the influence of institutions on growth and development, we find, for instance, the 
ones of Mauro (1995), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Easterly and Levine (2003), 
Rodrik et al. (2004), and Mehlum et al. (2006). All of them find a positive relation 
between good institutions and development.  
Furthermore, part of the literature on the natural resources curse relies in the role 
of institutions as the critical factor. For instance, in the Mehlum et al. (2006)’ study 
‘Countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners’ 
(p. 16); the final result depends on the quality of institutions
6
. However, in the empirical 
literature the term institutions encompass a wide range of indicators, including: a) 
institutional quality (the enforcement of property rights); b) political instability (riots, 
coups, civil wars); c) distinctiveness of political regimes (elections, constitutions, 
executive powers); d) social characteristics (differences in income and in ethnic, 
religious, and historical background); and e) social capital (the extent of civic activity 
and organizations). Economists often rely on one or several of these types of indicators 
to capture the features of institutions, although each one has a potentially different 
channel of impact on growth. However, the largest part of studies on institutional 
empirical approach relies on the importance of creating an institutional environment that 
is generally supportive of markets (e.g., protection of property rights, enforcement of 
contracts, and voluntary exchange at market-determined prices). 
Although some researchers have assumed institutions as an exogenous influence 
on the economy (for example, Gwartney et al., 2006), a lot of researchers have 
expressed concern that institutions are actually endogenous, reflecting various historical 
                                                 
6 These results contrast the claims of Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001) that institutions are not decisive for 
the resource curse. 
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or cultural influences. The econometric studies that try to deal with the endogeneity 
problem rely typically in the use of instrumental variable techniques. However, while 
the instrumental variable approach has the advantage of minimizing the endogeneity 
problem, the proxy usually used for that endeavor is of small usefulness for helping 
policy makers in its efforts for changing institutions in the present time period
7
. So, in 
our view, we need a measure of institutions that summarizes the various aspects of 
institutions in the recent time in a way that minimizes the statistical problem of 
endogeneity. 
 
 
a) The EFW 
 
In this paper we’ll use the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index 
constructed by Gwartney and Lawson (2003), as a measure of institutional quality
8
. The 
EFW is a comprehensive measure that includes 38 components, which are in the origin 
of ratings, in a zero-to-ten scale, for five main areas: (1) size of government, (2) legal 
structure and security of property rights, (3) access to sound money, (4) exchange with 
foreigners and (5) regulation of economic activity. So, the EFW index, as a summary 
index, is intended to measure the degree to which a country’s institutions and policies 
support voluntary exchange, the protection of property rights, open markets, and 
minimal regulation of economic activity.  
A country achieves a high EFW score when it does some things and abstains 
from doing others. In the former case, it deserves mention the protection of the property 
rights, the enforcement of contracts, and the removing of barriers to access sound 
money. On the other hand, governments must abstain from actions that inhibit voluntary 
trade, or limit entry into markets. Therefore, lower EFW ratings result when 
government spending is large, state-owned enterprises and regulations are widespread, 
tariffs and quotas are high, and exchange rate, interest rate, and other forms of price 
controls are widely imposed. 
                                                 
7 For instance, Acemoglu et al. (2001) use mortality rates of colonial settlers in colonized areas, Hall and 
Jones (1999) use the fraction of the population speaking English and Western European languages, as an 
instrument for institutional quality. Acemoglu et al. find that better institutions as measured by their 
language proxy result in higher levels of per capita income. 
8 The EFW annual report is published by a network of institutes in 59 different countries. See Berggren 
(2003) for a review of articles that have used the EFW data in the analysis of cross-country differences in 
income levels, growth rates, and related topics. 
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The attributes of the EFW index make it particularly useful as an indicator of 
institutional quality in our empirical tests. It summarizes many factors that economists 
have historically argued would facilitate economic activity and enhance growth and so it 
can save the effort of testing a great number of other proxies of institutions. On the 
other hand, because it is available at five year intervals over a period that begins in 1970 
make possible to examine not only the impact of the level of institutional quality but 
also the effects of changes in that quality of several decades. We will focus on the 
1980–2004 period.  
The inclusion of EFW (as level and as rate of variation) makes a new reduction 
in the sample dimension mandatory. But, as we may see in table 2, it allows us to show 
that controlling for institutions in 1980 increases not only the explanatory power of the 
regression but it also provides statistically significant estimates. So, table 2 shows some 
evidence for the fact that institutions (both level and variation) have a positive effect on 
the per capita growth rate. Additionally, the inclusion of level and rate of change of 
EFW makes Log GDP statistically significant (regression 3).  
 
Table 2 
Regression of economic growth on natural resources abundance, considering 
institutions, 1980-2004. 
 Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of GDP per capita, 1980–2004 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 
4.565* 
(2.677) 
3.970** 
(2.296) 
1.425 
(0.718) 
2.836* 
(7.173 
4.435** 
(2.412) 
3.973** 
(2.140) 
1.345 
(0.667) 
Xprim/X 
-0.0295* 
(-4.530) 
-0.0272* 
(-4.100) 
-0.0216* 
(-3.159) 
--- --- --- --- 
Agricultural raw 
materials 
--- --- --- 
-0.0093 
(-0.583) 
-0.0156 
(-0.896) 
-0.0187 
(-1.071) 
-0.0147 
(-0.875) 
Food --- --- --- 
-0.0268* 
(-3.613) 
-0.0305* 
(-3.585) 
-0.0272* 
(-3.106) 
-0.0234* 
(-2.745) 
Ores and metals --- --- --- 
-0.0325* 
(-3.389) 
-0.0366* 
(-3.436) 
-0.0348* 
(-3.258) 
-0.0341* 
(-3.323) 
Fuels --- --- --- 
-0.0255* 
(-3.9416) 
-0.0280* 
(-3.972) 
-0.0260* 
(-3.657) 
-0.017** 
(-2.225) 
Log GDP per capita 
-0.420 
(-1.012) 
-0.723 
(-1.560) 
-1.288* 
(-2.585) 
--- 
-0.3936 
(-0.890) 
-0.693 
(-1.423) 
-1.492* 
(-2.723) 
EFW 1980 --- 
0.285 
(1.612) 
0.910* 
(2.924) 
--- --- --- 
1.026* 
(3.154) 
EFW growth --- --- 
0.840* 
(2.409) 
--- --- 
0.263 
(1.426) 
1.036* 
(2.796) 
2R  0.198 0.213 0.255 0.188 0.186 0.196 0.258 
F test 11.722 8.828 8.450 6.022 4.964 4.528 5.325 
N 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
Source: Data from World Bank (2007) and EFW (2006). 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; *Significant at 1 % level; **Significant at 5 % level. 
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In the recent literature, there are two distinguished approaches to assess the importance 
of institutions and political authorities as determinants of growth and development: (i) 
new comparative economics, where the rights of the individual in law (including 
property rights), anti-corruption measures and other governance-related factors are 
considered to be the main causes, with the significance of these main causes often being 
estimated by cross-country analyses; and (ii) the diversity of authority systems 
approach, which recognizes differences in institutions over time and across space and 
examines how economic agents respond in different contexts to the specific set of rules 
and regulations governing markets. In this paper we have followed until now the first 
approach. The results obtained allow us to say that institutions and political authority 
matter for the growth of a country subject to the symptoms of natural resources curse. 
But, although the results don’t allow us to set aside the idea that the quality of 
institutions is crucial to surpass situations generally subject to natural resources curse, it 
is also noteworthy that this approach is insufficient to say what are the appropriate 
channels for surpassing the external specialization in natural resources. 
 
 
b) Can good institutions prevent the curse? 
 
Mehlum et al. (2006) argue that the resource curse only appears in countries with 
inferior institutions (p.3). Perhaps this is so for the 1965-1990 period, but the piece of 
evidence they use is not bulletproof. To show this a simple test can be made. We plot in 
Figures 2, 3, and 4 the average yearly economic growth from 1980 to 2004 vs. natural 
resources abundance measured as share in total merchandise exports splitting our 
sample of 88 countries in three sub samples built in accordance with the value of EFW 
for 1980. So, figure 2 is based on data for 21 countries with EFW below 4.5; figure 3 
includes 34 countries with EFW between 4.5 and 5.5 and figure 4 clusters the other 33 
countries with EFW above 5.5. 
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Figure 2. 
The “curse” in countries with inferior institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data from World Bank (2007) and EFW (2006). 
Note: See countries in Appendix. 
 
Although the 2R  appears to be higher in figure 2 than in figures 3 and 4 in no one of 
them we may discard the hypothesis of the resources course, if this is only characterized 
by a negative relationship between economic growth and the relative natural resources 
abundance.  
 
Figure 3.  
The “curse” in countries with intermediate institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data from World Bank (2007) and EFW (2006). 
Note: See countries in Appendix. 
 
In fact, although less significant than in figure 2 (t = –4.21), in the simple regression of 
the figures 3 and 4, test t for the slope is –2.27 and –2.23, respectively, which is 
significant at a 5 per cent level.  
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Figure 4. The “curse” in countries with superior institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data from World Bank (2007) and EFW (2006). 
Note: See countries in Appendix. 
 
So, even in countries with good institutions measured by EFW is visible the negative 
relationship between the growth rate of GDP per capita and the share of natural 
resources in total exports of goods. 
 
 
5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
 
As we have seen in previous section there is a positive association between growth rate 
and both the initial level and rate of change in institutions, when we control the exports 
of natural resources. But, although the estimates presented are supportive of the idea 
that good institutions enhance growth some other questions must be answered before we 
may conclude that there is a natural resources curse, and that good institutions measured 
by a single indicator can avoid this “curse”. Some of those questions are of empirical 
nature but others are theoretical. Finding answers for every one of them is a heavy task 
that cannot be dealt in the limited space of this paper. So, before concluding we select 
only two topics for future research: the stability of the results across time and the 
capacity of the measure of institutions used in this paper to summarize the aspects of 
institutions that matter most in a developing natural resources-based country. 
Respecting to the first topic, table 3 gives an indication of the evolution of both 
average growth rate of GDP per capita and the structure of merchandise exports. 
Whereas the share of primary goods in total exports decrease from 1980 to 1990 the 
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average growth of GDP per capita increase from 1.19 to 1.67. And respecting to 
institutions measured by EFW we see an evolution in the same direction: both the level 
and the rate of variation of EFW increase from the first to the second period.  
 
Table 3. Average growth and structure of exports 
Structure of merchandise exports in the beginning of period 
Period 
GDP per 
capita growth Primary total 
Agric. Raw 
materials 
Food Fuels 
Ores and 
Metals 
       
1980-2004 1.19 66.84 7.56 32.80 17.58 8.89 
1990-2004 1.67 55.61 4.83 27.03 18.07 6.20 
Source: Data from World Bank (2007). 
 
In spite of the above mentioned comprehensiveness of EFW as an indicator of quality of 
institutions, if we look at countries often known as cursed by natural resources 
abundance, we see another aspect of institutions, not measured or clearly 
underrepresented in EFW, that is very apparent in those countries: the lack of social 
cohesion. This is one reason why is important considering not only the institutions that 
get the markets better but also the institutions that improve social cohesion. So, the 
efficacy of a cross-country regression approach depends critically of the availability of 
such a measure. But if so, a new question is born: How the lack of social cohesion can 
been integrated in a comprehensive measure of quality of institutions? 
The results of this paper are very preliminary but based on them, we only can 
arrive to a conclusion: they show a negative correlation between exports of natural 
resources and economic growth rate. But this is not sufficient to assume that exporters 
of natural resources are cursed. Overcoming the alleged “curse” implies to increase the 
share of man made-goods in total exports. This needs a transformation that probably 
would have results in improving the quality of institutions.  
However preliminary our results are supportive of two policy implications both 
at national and international level. At the national level, perhaps the more important 
implication is that there is no justification for the pessimistic conviction that certain 
countries will remain caught up in a low growth trap dependent on natural resources and 
simultaneously constrained with institutions that impede their growth. Sustained growth 
can be possible with initially imperfect institutions; what is important is that the 
Government itself be convincing in its commitment to making the changes that will 
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remove institutional obstacles to growth without overlook the necessity of maintain a 
sufficient social cohesion. At the international level, support should be directed towards 
improving specific areas of control fault, such as public budget and improving 
organizational systems, rather than imposing on aid-recipient countries wide-ranging 
global governance measures, that are usually measured by a cross-section general used 
but subjective index. 
 
 
References 
 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2001). “The Colonial 
Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American 
Economic Review 91(5): 1369-401. 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2002). “Reversal of 
Fortune: Geography and Development in the Making of the Modern World 
Income Distribution,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4), 1231-1294. 
Ahammad, Helal and Clements, Kenneth (1999). “What Does Minerals Growth Mean 
to Western Australia?” Resources Policy, Vol. 25, p.p. 1-14 
Auty, Richard M. (1990). Resource-Based Industrialization: Sowing the Oil in Eight 
Developing Countries. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Auty, Richard M. (1991). Sustaining Development in Mineral Economics: The Resource 
Curse Thesis, London, Routledge 
Auty, Richard M. (1994). “Industrial Policy Reform in Six Large Newly Industrializing 
Countries: The Resource Curse Thesis”, World Development, 22, 11-26.  
Auty, Richard M. (1998). “Mineral Wealth and the Economic Transition: Kazakstan”, 
Resources Policy, Vol. 24, pp. 241-249 
Auty, Richard M. (2001). Resource Abundance and Economic Development, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
Baldwin, R. E. (1966). Economic Development and Export Growth: A Study of 
Northern Rhodesia, 1920-1960. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of 
California Press. 
Barro, Robert J. (1991). “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 106 (2), 407-443. 
 18
Berggren, Niclas (2003). “The benefits of Economic Freedom: A Survey”, The 
Independent Review VIII(2): 193-211. 
Clements, Kennet W. and Johnson, Peter L. (2003). “The Minerals Industry and 
Employment in Western Australia: Assessing its Impacts in Federal 
Electorates”, Resources Policy, Vol 26, p.p.77-89 
Davis, Graham (1998). “The Minerals Sector, Sectoral Analysis, and Economic 
Development”, Resources Policy, Vol. 24, No. 4, p.p. 217-228. 
Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer. 
(2003). “The New Comparative Economics,” Journal of Comparative 
Economics 31(4), 595-619. 
Easterly, William and Ross Levine (2003). “Tropics, germs, and crops: how 
endowments influence economic development.” Journal of Monetary Economics 
50(1): 3-39. 
Gelb, A. H. (1988). Windfall Gains: Blessing or Curse?, New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Gillis, M., Perkin, H. D., Roemer, M. and Snodgrass, D. R. (1996). Economics of 
Development, Norton. 
Gwartney, J and R. Lawson (2003). Economic Freedom of the World: Annual Report 
2003. Vancouver, B.C.: Fraser Institute. 
Gwartney, J D. Randall G. Holcombe, and Robert A. Lawson (2006). “Institutions and 
the Impact of Investment on Growth”, Kyklos, Vol. 59(2), 255–273 
Gylfason, T. (2000). “Resources, Agriculture, and Economic Growth in Economies in 
Transition”, Kyklos, 4, 545-580. 
Gylfason, T. (2001a). “Natural Resources, Education, and Economic Development”, 
European Economic Review, 45, 847-859. 
Gylfason, T. (2001b). “Nature, Power and Growth”, Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol 48, No 5, 558-588.  
Hall, R. E. and Jones, C. I. (1999). “Why do some countries produce so much more 
output per-worker than others?”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 114, pp. 
83–116. 
Hirschman, A. O. (1958). The Strategy of Economic Development. New Haven CT: 
Yale University Press. 
Holmes, Stephen, (1995). Passions and Constraints, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
 19
Knack, Steven and Philip Keefer (1995). “Institutions and Economic Performance: 
Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Measures.” Economics and Politics 7(3): 
207-227. 
Krueger, A. (1974). “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society”, American 
Economic Review, 64, 291-303. 
Lane, P. and A. Tornell (1995). "Power Concentration and Growth," Harvard Institute 
of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 1720, May  
Leite, C. and Weidmann, J. (1999). Does mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, 
Corruption and Economic Growth, IMF Working Paper.  
Lewis, S. R. (1989). "Primary Exporting Countries." Chapter 29 in Hollis Chenery and 
T. N. Srinivasan (eds.), Handbook of Development Economics, Volume II. 
Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 1541-1600. 
Matsuyama, K. (1992). "Agricultural Productivity, Comparative Advantage, and 
Economic Growth." Journal of Economic Theory. 58, pp. 317-334.. 
Mauro, Paolo (1995). "Corruption and Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110: 
681-712.  
Mauro, Paolo (1998). “Corruption: Causes, Consequences and Agenda for Further 
Research”, Finance and Development, March 1998, 10-14 
Mehlum Halvor, Karl Moene and Ragnar Torvik (2006). “Institutions and The Resource 
Curse”, The Economic Journal, 116, 1–20. 
Nelson, R.R. and Phelps, P.S. (1966). “Investment in Humans, Technological Diffusion, 
and Economic Growth”, American Economic Review, 61, 69-75 
North, Douglass C. (1981). Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: 
Norton & Co. 
Pessoa, Argentino (2004). "Institutional innovations, growth performance and 
policy," ERSA conference papers ersa04p157, European Regional Science 
Association. (Available at http://ideas.repec.org/e/ppe160.html). 
Prebisch Raul (1950). The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal 
Problems (United Nations Lake Success, N.Y.). 
Rodriguez, F. and Sachs, J. D. (1999). “Why Do Resource-Abundant Economies Grow 
More Slowly?”, Journal of Economic Growth, 4, 277-303. 
Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian and Francesco Trebbi (2002). “Institutions Rule: 
The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic 
Development.” Journal of Economic Growth 9(2), 131-165. 
 20
Roemer, M. (1970). Fishing for Growth; Export-led Development in Peru, 1950-1967. 
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press,  
Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Warner, Andrew M. (1995), Natural resource abundance and 
economic growth, (http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/5398.html NBER 
Working Paper 5398).  
Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Warner, Andrew M. (1997) “Natural Resource Abundance and 
Economic Growth” Center for International Development and Harvard Institute 
for International Development Harvard University Cambridge MA.  
Sachs, J.D. and Warner, A.M. (1999a). “The Big Push, Natural Resource Booms and 
Growth”, Journal of Development Economics, 59, 43-76.  
Sachs, J.D. and Warner, A.M. (1999b), “Natural Resource Intensity and Economic 
Growth”, in Mayer J., B. Chambers and A. Farooq (eds.), Development Policies 
in Natural Resource Economics, Edward Elgar. 
Sachs, J. D. and Warner, A.M. (2001). “Natural Resource and Economic Development: 
The Curse of Natural Resources”, European Economic Review, 45, 827-838. 
Seers, D. (1964). "The Mechanism of an Open Petroleum Economy." Social and 
Economic Studies, 1964:13, pp. 233-242. 
Singer, Hans, W. (1950). “The Distribution of Trade between Investing and Borrowing 
Countries,” American Economic Review, 40 (May), 473-85.  
Stijns Jean-Philippe C. (2001). “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth 
Revisited”. Working Paper University of California at Berkeley.  
WESS (2006). World Economic and Social Survey 2006. United Nations, New York. 
Wright, Gavin (1990). “The Origins of American Industrial Success, 1879-1940,” The 
American Economic Review, 80 (4), 651–68. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 21
Appendix: Sub-samples of countries 
EFW<4.5 <4.5EFW<5.5 EFW>5.5 
Ghana 
Bangladesh 
Nigeria 
Turkey 
Brazil 
Israel 
Nicaragua 
Algeria 
Madagascar 
Jamaica 
Peru 
Argentina 
Gabon 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Togo 
Hungary 
Malawi 
El Salvador 
Morocco 
Bolivia 
Zambia  
Pakistan 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
Senegal 
Kenya 
Ecuador 
Colombia 
Dominican Republic 
Sri Lanka 
India 
Iceland 
Niger 
Tunisia 
Philippines 
Costa Rica 
Belize 
Malta 
Mali 
Jordan 
Congo, Rep. 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Benin 
Mexico 
Italy 
Panama 
Cyprus 
Indonesia 
Chile 
Nepal 
Uruguay 
Cameroon 
Fiji 
South Africa 
Honduras  
Paraguay 
Portugal 
Greece 
Sweden 
Haiti 
Korea, Rep. 
Spain 
France 
Kuwait 
Norway 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Bahamas, The 
Thailand 
Guatemala 
Denmark 
New Zealand 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Austria 
Finland 
Japan 
Malaysia 
Australia 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Canada 
Bahrain 
Venezuela, RB 
Germany 
United States 
Singapore 
Switzerland 
Hong Kong, China  
 
 
